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Abstract—In wireless networks, stations can improve their re-
ceived quality of service (QoS) by handling packets of source 
flows with higher priority. Additionally, in cooperative relay 
networks, the relays can handle transit flows with lower priority. 
We use game theory to model a two-hop relay network where 
each of the two involved stations can commit such selfish QoS 
manipulation. We design and evaluate a reputation-based incen-
tive scheme called RISC2WIN, whereby a trusted third party 
(e.g., an access point) can limit selfish behavior and preserve ap-
propriate QoS for both stations. 
Keywords—game theory, IEEE 802.11, modeling, Nash equi-
librium, QoS, relay networks, reputation, selfish attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The distributed nature of wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) requires for stations to compete for access to a 
common resource: the radio channel. Stations can improve 
their level of quality of service (QoS) by handling packets of 
source flows with higher priority. Additionally, if a station’s 
role in the network involves forwarding traffic, it can handle 
transit flows with lower priority [1]. We refer to the traffic flow 
priority upgrading and downgrading behavior as selfish QoS 
manipulation (SQM) attacks. For a TCP/IP 802.11-based 
WLAN, examples of mechanisms used to execute an SQM 
attack would be changing the QoS designation (the Class of 
Service, CoS) in an IP header or modifying the parameters of 
the medium access function. Selfish attacks in WLANs have 
been studied in the literature [1]-[4] and they have been shown 
to be a threat to two-hop relay networks [5], where cooperation 
is particularly required. 
Two-hop relay networks are a form of cooperative wireless 
communication used to extend the coverage of WLANs. Sta-
tions with a direct connection to an access point (AP) act as 
relays, i.e., share their connection with other, neighboring sta-
tions, which either cannot reach the AP themselves or have a 
poor direct connection to it. Such an approach is known to 
have many advantages in terms of network coverage and per-
formance [6]. Consider the network in Fig. 1, which features a 
fixed access point (AP) and user stations A and B, with the AP 
and station A as well as stations A and B mutually in range, AP 
and station B out of range, and station A serving as a voluntary 
relay for station B. For this service station A is granted a privi-
leged status at the AP (e.g., free or high-speed Internet access). 
However, without any enforcement, a dominant strategy for a 
selfish station A would be to ensure the lowest possible QoS 
for station B that permits to retain the privileged status (via 
downgrading SQM attacks such as medium access priority 
manipulation performed on transit traffic from station B), as 
well as to demand the highest possible QoS for itself (via up-
grading SQM attacks such as falsely announcing high CoS 
performed on own source traffic). Such SQM attacks would 
ruin station B’s QoS perception. On its part, station B may find 
it beneficial to always or frequently demand high QoS by set-
ting high CoS, i.e., by performing upgrading SQM attacks on 
its source traffic. 
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Fig. 1. Cooperative two-hop wireless relay network. From the relay’s perspec-
tive, uplink traffic is either source or transit. 
We assume that deterministic detection of false CoS an-
nouncement by examining intrinsic CoS at the AP, e.g., using 
traffic classification [7], is too costly to be practical, and that 
the intrinsic CoS statistics of generated traffic are not known to 
other stations, which rules out statistical detection (Section III). 
Therefore, incentive-based solutions have to be designed. The 
main challenge is to disincentivize false CoS announcement at 
stations A and B (i.e., encourage them to demand QoS in ac-
cordance with source traffic’s intrinsic CoS) and medium ac-
cess priority manipulation at station A (i.e., encourage it to re-
lay transit traffic from B in accordance with the demanded QoS 
as announced through its CoS). Moreover, station A should not 
find itself forced to ensure a higher QoS for station B than it 
does for itself, in which case it might reconsider trading QoS 
received by its source traffic for the privileged status at the AP. 
Possible approaches include the following: 
 Arrange a scheme whereby station B provides some reward 
to station A (monetary or otherwise) depending on the de-
manded and received QoS. This renders SQM attacks point-
less on both sides, but is costly to implement in a realistic 
scenario (due to the complexity of proper accounting, cryp-
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tographic protocols, fraud prevention, etc.) and may need 
delicate contract design [8], [9]. 
 Have the AP reward station A for ensuring satisfactory, ra-
ther than lowest possible, QoS for station B in return for the 
privileged status. However, a fair payment scheme is diffi-
cult to design, since QoS demanded by station B for own 
source traffic may result from upgrading SQM attacks.  
We take another approach by designing a heuristic reputa-
tion scheme at the AP that links the prospect of retaining the 
privileged status by station A with receiving satisfactory QoS 
by station B’s source traffic. Our contribution is called Reputa-
tion-based Incentive Scheme for Cooperative 2-hop WIreless 
relay Networks (RISC2WIN). In contrast with known reputa-
tion schemes designed for distributed wireless networks [10] 
ours is the first to address cooperative scenarios featuring an 
AP and stations executing SQM attacks (Section III). In 
RISC2WIN, the AP maintains A’s reputation rA such that 
 station A is interested in keeping rA away from a critically 
low value at which its privileged status at the AP is revoked, 
 acquiring high rA instills the AP’s trust and is beneficial in 
terms of station A’s received QoS, and 
 high QoS received by station B may bolster rA, while high 
QoS received by station A may lower rA. 
Hence the introduced reputation produces desirable effects for 
station B as well as is desired by station A; as such it can be 
compared to commodity, rather than fiduciary, currency. 
RISC2WIN operates independently of the underlying QoS 
provisioning and medium access mechanisms, hence of the 
wireless technology. It instills a noncooperative game among 
stations A and B, where a station’s utility is related to received 
QoS and whose Nash equilibria (NE) yield satisfactory QoS for 
both stations
1
. A distinctive feature is that the scheme does not 
rely on SQM attack detection, since the AP is either uncertain 
that an SQM attack is in progress or uncertain that it deserves 
punishment (Sections III.C and III.D). We define rational 
threshold-based station strategies (Section IV) and show 
through simulations that RISC2WIN can limit selfish behavior 
and preserve QoS for both stations (Section V). 
II. MODEL 
A. QoS Provisioning 
Although it can work with any wireless technology, the 
proposed scheme will be described in the context of IEEE 
802.11 networks. QoS differentiation in such networks uses a 
class-based approach [11]. First, at the IP layer, packets are 
assigned a CoS which is stored in their IP headers. Then, based 
on these values the MAC layer, using the enhanced distributed 
channel access (EDCA) function of IEEE 802.11, maps the 
higher-layer traffic class to one of the defined access categories 
(ACs). Without loss of generality, we restrict our analysis to 
one high-priority AC (voice, VO) and one low-priority AC 
(best effort, BE). Each AC is characterized by medium access 
parameters which assure statistical prioritization with respect to 
                                                          
1  An NE is an operating point at which no station can benefit by unilaterally 
changing its behavior [12]. 
medium access delays. The CoS and AC settings will become 
important when characterizing a station’s traffic and discussing 
its possible behaviors and strategies. 
B. Traffic 
Stations A and B transmit user sessions towards the AP. 
Each session consists of an integer number of chunks of fixed 
duration. We consider a discrete time axis whose each time slot 
corresponds to a chunk (Fig. 2). Let X(k), LX(k), and iCoSX(k) 
be, respectively, the start time, duration, and intrinsic class of 
service of station X’s kth session, X  {A,B}, k  {1,2,…}; its 
successive chunks therefore end at times X(k) + 1,…,X(k) + 
LX(k). Stations A and B operate under saturation traffic, i.e., 
X(k) = X(k  1) + LX(k) (this assumption simplifies the model 
and can be easily relaxed). Both LX(k)  {1,2,…} and iCoSX(k) 
 {BE,VO} are discrete-time user processes governed by some 
stationary probability distributions; let X = Pr[iCoSX(k) = VO] 
(A and B are the respective stations’ private knowledge). By 
CoSX(k) we denote the CoS announced in the IP headers. 
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Fig. 2. Traffic model and station behavior. 
C. Behaviors and Strategies 
Station behavior refers to handling source packets depend-
ing on their intrinsic CoS and (in the case of station A) han-
dling transit packets depending on their CoS announced in IP 
headers. At the start of its kth session at time t, each station X 
demands a certain QoS level by setting CoSX(k) and decides its 
medium access priority by setting acX(t). Moreover, station A 
decides the medium access priority for transit traffic from sta-
tion B by setting acBA(t). 
Neutral behavior prescribes setting CoSX(k) = iCoSX(k), 
acX(t) = CoSX(k), and (at station A) acBA(t) = CoSB(k). However, 
announcing a different CoS (i.e., false CoS announcement) and 
deciding a different medium access priority is possible and 
subject to station X's discretion. We assume that station X can-
not falsify session delimiters, i.e., pretend that the kth session 
starts at a time different from X(k). Session delimiters are also 
assumed to be recognizable to both stations and the AP. In par-
ticular this implies that CoSX(k) remains unchanged throughout 
the kth session. On the other hand, acX(t) and acBA(t) can be 
decided on a chunk-by-chunk basis; to avoid excessive deci-
sion making we assume that they can only be changed at any 
station’s session ends. Any behavior other than neutral will be 
referred to as an SQM attack. 
A station strategy refers to a well-planned sequence of be-
haviors across successive sessions that aims to maximize long-
term perception of received QoS, quantified in Section II.E. 
D. Attack Feasibility and Detectability 
Incentive-based solutions are only justified when SQM at-
tacks are undetectable outside the attacker station or cannot be 
fairly punished as discussed later. Since we have assumed that 
neither the AP nor the stations A and B have a traffic classifica-
tion capability and that iCoSX(k) and X are private knowledge, 
falsifying CoS headers of source packets is not easily detecta-
ble. However, station A must refrain from detectable misbehav-
ior toward traffic from station B as it would jeopardize its 
privileged status at the AP; e.g., packet dropping or falsifying 
CoS headers could be directly observed at station B by sensing 
station A’s transmissions or by communication with the AP via 
a secure end-to-end signaling scheme. 
The detectability of SQM attacks through selfish manipula-
tion of medium access priority depends on the attack mecha-
nism used. In the case of EDCA, forcing a packet into a desired 
AC queue must be accompanied by setting CoS accordingly in 
the packet header (i.e., acX(t) = CoSX(k) must hold when station 
X’s kth session is starting), otherwise the discrepancy between 
the CoS and AC fields in the packet header is easily observa-
ble.
2
 Therefore the attack is undetectable if performed on 
source traffic, but detectable if performed on transit traffic. An 
undetectable SQM attack is also possible by artificially delay-
ing packets before passing them into an AC queue; note that 
only downgrading is practical in this case, since upgrading 
would require that artificial delay be applied by default to all 
BE traffic and only skipped during an attack. 
To summarize, the following SQM attacks are both feasible 
and undetectable: 
 falsify CoS and set ac accordingly to perform upgrading or 
downgrading of source traffic, i.e., iCoSX(k)  acX(t) = 
CoSX(k) at any station X  {A,B}, and  
 introduce artificial delay at station A to perform 
downgrading of transit traffic, i.e., VO = CoSB(k)  acBA(t) = 
BE; if performed along with upgrading of source traffic via 
CoS falsification, such an SQM attack is referred to as 
combined.  
Fig. 2 illustrates station behaviors. Note that although at time t 
= B(l + 2) station A chooses neutral behavior, CoSA(k + 1)  
iCoSA(k + 1) must be maintained until t = A(k + 2). 
E. QoS and Utilities 
A chunk is assumed long enough for the current behaviors 
to take effect and for both stations to observe the received QoS 
                                                          
2  Undetectable setting of acX(t)  CoSX(k) under EDCA would be feasible if 
AC fields in transmitted packets could be set arbitrarily, i.e., if the MAC 
firmware could be easily tampered with; another option would be packet-by-
packet changing of EDCA parameters of an AC queue. Both options are im-
practical from an implementation viewpoint.  
with satisfactory accuracy. To this end, station A conducts rou-
tine measurements of throughput, packet delays and loss, 
whereas station B derives those either by observing station A’s 
transmissions in a single-channel network, or via secure end-
to-end signaling from the AP (e.g., using a direct low-quality 
link as in Fig. 1, if it exists, or encrypted transport-layer mes-
sages). We moreover assume that received QoS only depends 
on the ACs of the uplink traffic from stations A and B compet-
ing for bandwidth around station A (that is, at the considered 
level of QoS granularity, we neglect the impact of downlink 
traffic from the AP or hidden stations, if any, as well as of 
transmission impairments, virtual collisions among AC queues, 
transport-layer protocols, etc.). The QoS received by station 
X’s source session chunk starting at time t can therefore be 
expressed as fX(acA(t), acBA(t), acB(t)), where fX() is a public 
knowledge function whose exact form depends on the MAC 
performance model. Note that received QoS is observable to 
both stations and the AP. In our simplified model, only two 
QoS levels, low and high, are distinguished. The low level, 
assigned here the numerical value 0, is satisfactory for BE traf-
fic (as this traffic class has no QoS requirements, no level be-
low that is defined), and the high level, with the numerical val-
ue 1, is satisfactory for VO traffic. Hence, fX()  {0, 1}. To get 
a qualitative insight, for X = A we take fX(acA(t), acBA(t), acB(t)) 
= 1 iff acA(t) = VO  (acB(t) = BE  acBA(t) = BE), and for X = 
B, fX(acA(t), acBA(t), acB(t)) = 1 iff acA(t) = BE  acB(t) = VO  
acBA(t) = VO. That is, station A receives high-level QoS if its 
source VO traffic does not have to compete with the two seg-
ments (incoming and relayed) of the VO traffic flow from sta-
tion B, whereas station B receives high-level QoS if its source 
VO traffic is relayed as such and does not have to compete with 
VO source traffic from station A. With so defined fX(), the stra-
tegic situation is not quite checks and balances: station A has a 
strategic advantage, as it can always ensure high-level QoS for 
its source session by performing a combined SQM attack, 
while station B only receives high-level QoS for its source ses-
sion if station A does not demand high-level QoS. Per-session 
utility of station X  {A,B}, calculated at the end of the kth 
session, is taken to be the QoS level averaged over all chunks 
throughout the session duration, cf. Fig. 1: 
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Note that since received QoS and session delimiters are ob-
servable to both stations and the AP, so are uX(k). For specific 
sequences (LX(k))k=1,2,… = (X(k)  X(k1))k=1,2,… and iCo-
SA(k))k=1,2,…, long-term average utilities of station X fall be-
tween 0 and 1 and are given by   
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where ac  {BE,VO}. In the case when no SQM attacks are 
performed by either station, uX(k) = 0 if iCoSX(k) = BE, hence 
0
SQM no
BE
X
u ; moreover, uX(k) ≤ 1 if iCoSX(k) = VO due to the 
“natural” competition between overlapping chunks of intrinsi-
cally VO sessions transmitted by stations A and B, hence typi-
cally 1
SQM no
VO
X
u . For the saturated traffic scenario and in the 
absence of incentive schemes, 
X
o
X
VO
X
uu  1incentives no SQM, no , 
where X' denotes the other station. If SQM attacks are per-
formed, their success can be measured by 0BE
X
u . 
Each station X plans its strategy with a goal to maximize 
VO
X
BE
XX
wuuU  , where w > 0 reflects the importance the sta-
tion attaches to the QoS received by its source VO traffic rela-
tive to the success of SQM attacks applied to its source BE 
traffic (in a realistic model, w ≥ 1). Maximizing UX is easy if 
the other station exhibits neutral behaviorit is enough to con-
stantly perform an SQM attack: combined if X = A, or upgrad-
ing of source traffic if X = B. Indeed, fA(1, 0, acB(t)) ≥ fA(acA(t), 
acBA(t), acB(t)) and fB(acA(t), 1, 1) ≥ fB(acA(t), acBA(t), acB(t)) 
regardless of acA(t), acBA(t), and acB(t). The other station is then 
left with zero utilities, since fB(1, 0, acB(t)) = fA(acA(t), 1, 1) = 0 
regardless of acA(t) and acB(t). Hence, neutral behavior does 
not ensure satisfactory utilities in the face of SQM attacks and 
SQM attacks may have to be performed in self-defense. This 
sheds new light on SQM attack detectability and punishability. 
The AP might detect and punish an ongoing SQM attack based 
on observed uX(k) and the public function fX(). For example, 
uB(k) < 1 or uA(l) = 1 while CoSB(k) = VO indicates downgrad-
ing of transit traffic (and possibly upgrading of source traffic) 
at station A. However, the punishment is not guaranteed to be 
fair: station B may be performing an undetectable upgrading 
SQM attack and station A’s attack may be performed in self-
defense. The above difficulty of the detection and punishment 
approach further supports an incentive-based approach, where 
stations A and B are players in a one-shot noncooperative game 
(whereas the AP is a trusted third party). 
In the considered game, the stations’ long-term average 
utilities are the payoffs. Due to station A’s strategic advantage, 
without any external incentive scheme the game admits a 
unique weak NE with highly asymmetric utilities, incentivizing 
station A to select a combined SQM attack for each session and 
leaving station B with a zero utility. This is because fA(1, 0, 
acB(t)) = 1 and fB(1, 0, acB(t)) = 0 regardless of acB(t). 
III.  REPUTATION SCHEME 
The proposed RISC2WIN reputation scheme aims to en-
courage stations’ strategies that avoid the above described un-
desirable Nash equilibrium. Note that it is probably impossible 
to disincentivize SQM attacks completely if their direct detec-
tion and punishment is not employed and if their success is 
valued highly by the two stations (i.e., if w is small). In line 
with the previous discussion we postulate that if w is large 
enough then at the Nash equilibria, 
 BE
X
u  is relatively small, i.e., station X attacks with restraint, 
 VO
X
u  is not distinctly less than o
X
u , i.e., QoS received for 
intrinsically VO traffic should only depend on the “natural” 
competition between VO traffic from stations A and B, and   
 station A typically does not receive lower QoS for its source 
traffic than does station B, i.e., ac
B
ac
A
uu   for ac  {BE,VO}.  
To reward station A for its relay services, the AP maintains 
station A’s current reputation rA, and updates it session by ses-
sion based on both stations’ received QoS (more precisely, per-
session utility). The idea is for station A to keep rA within an 
acceptable range. We prescribe that rA is incremented when 
station B’s VO traffic receives, or station A’s VO traffic does 
not receive ‘high enough’ QoS, and decremented when station 
B’s VO traffic does not receive, or station A’s VO traffic does 
receive ‘high enough’ QoS. The QoS level that counts as ‘high 
enough’ is the lower, the higher the current rA. Accordingly, 
the reputation scheme follows principles (i) through (v): 
(i)  to retain a privileged status at the AP, station A must not let 
rA drop below a critical value, here fixed at 0; for conven-
ience, we allow only discrete rA  {0,1,…,R} with R ≥ 1, 
(ii)  to acquire a higher rA, station A must ensure that station B 
frequently receives high-level QoS if it demands it for its 
source traffic, 
(iii) station A receiving high QoS for its source traffic retains rA 
if station B is demanding high QoS, 
(iv) at a higher rA, station A finds it easier to receive high-level 
QoS for its source traffic, while caring less for the QoS re-
ceived by station B, and 
(v)  by demanding high QoS with restraint station B curbs rA. 
Thus a high rA translates for station A into the AP’s trust that 
manifests itself in more liberal conditions of keeping rA high in 
the future. This in turn improves station A’s QoS-related utility. 
One notices that the above design principles do not explicitly 
refer to SQM attack detection. 
Let rA(t) be station A’s current reputation at time t = 
0,1,2,… and )(tuX  be the average station X’s per-session utili-
ty (including BE and VO traffic) observed by the AP up to time 
t. Define the modified reputation as 
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Any changes in rA can be made only at the times when sta-
tion A’s or station B’s session ends. Consider first t = B(k + 1), 
where A(l) < B(k + 1) ≤ A(l + 1), i.e., station B’s kth session 
has just ended and station A’s lth session is in progress, and 
denote by t

 the instant of time just prior to t. The AP can read 
the demanded QoS level as CoSB(k) in packet headers transmit-
ted by station B and faithfully relayed by station A as argued in 
Section II.D (recall that CoSB(k) is subject to station B’s behav-
ior choice and need not equal iCoSB(k)). If CoSB(k) = BE, rA(t

) 
is not incremented (as dictated by principle (v)) or decremented 
(for otherwise station B might too easily damage rA(t) by per-
forming downgrading SQM attacks). In line with principle (ii), 
if CoSB(k) = VO then the AP checks if the QoS received by 
station B is ‘high enough’: 
 uB(k) ≥ 1  rAm(t

)/R,  (4) 
in which case rA(t

) is incremented by 1. Otherwise rA(t

) is 
retained rather than decrementedsuch a design decision 
stems from the possibility that CoSB(k) = VO signifies an ongo-
ing upgrading SQM attack at station B or that station A may be 
transmitting legitimate VO source traffic (CoSA(l) = iCoSA(l)) 
and not performing an upgrading SQM attack. In line with 
principle (iv), the closer rA(t) is to R, the easier it is for station 
A to produce a satisfactory comparison at the AP and drive its 
reputation away from the critical value 0. This permits to re-
ceive high QoS for future source traffic (perhaps through SQM 
attacks) with less concern about producing satisfactory com-
parisons. Due to (3), a satisfactory comparison is also easier to 
produce when )()( tutu AB  ; this heuristic adds an element of 
self-regulation: station A regains high reputation faster if recent 
reputation dynamics have been favoring station B’s utilities. 
Consider now t = A(k + 1), where B(l) < A(k + 1) ≤ B(l + 
1), i.e., station A’s kth session has just ended and station B’s lth 
session is in progress. Recall that station A signals the demand-
ed QoS level as CoSA(k) in transmitted packet headers (CoSA(k) 
is subject to a behavior choice and need not equal iCoSA(k)). If 
CoSA(k) = BE, no changes of the current reputation are made. If 
CoSA(k) = VO then the AP checks if 
 uA(k) ≥ rAm(t

)/R, (5) 
in which case rA(t

) is either decremented by 1 if CoSB(l) = BE, 
or retained if CoSB(l) = VO. Thus receiving relatively low QoS 
cannot damage station A’s reputation and, in line with principle 
(iii), neither can receiving high QoS if at the same time station 
B is demanding high QoS. On the other hand, in line with prin-
ciple (v), the reputation may go down if station A receives high 
QoS while station B is demanding low QoS. Such design deci-
sions are to disincentivize upgrading SQM attacks at station B. 
As before, the self-regulation heuristic (3) also applies. Thus 
the reputation dynamics are: at t = B(k + 1), rA(t) becomes 
min{R,  rA(t

) + 1} iff 
 RtrkuVOkCoS
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/)(1)()(
m
 , (6) 
whereas at t = A(k + 1) such that B(l) < A(k + 1) ≤ B(l + 1), 
rA(t) becomes rA(t

)  1 iff 
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and in all other situations remains unchanged. If A(k + 1) = 
B(l + 1) = t, i.e., both stations’ session ends coincide on the 
slotted time axis, then (6) is checked first and the resulting rA(t) 
is substituted for rA(t

) when checking (7). 
The updated reputation values are disseminated by the AP 
using a direct low-quality link (Fig. 1), if it exists; even if it 
does not, then, provided that rA(0) is public knowledge, stations 
A and B can follow the above dynamics as they can both ob-
serve CoSX(k) and uX(k). Hence rA(k), too, is public knowledge. 
This gives rise to the heuristic strategies described below. 
IV. THRESHOLD STRATEGIES 
A truly sophisticated station X’s strategy would determine 
its behavior choice for each new session based on the whole or 
recent history of both stations’ observed behaviors and utilities, 
with a view of maximizing the long-term average utility UX. 
This might be computationally quite complex and require far-
sighted discounting of future per-session utilities. For relatively 
inexpensive wireless devices, simpler strategies should be en-
visaged that do not slow down packet transmission and only 
require a few arithmetic operations per session. In this study 
we narrow the class of considered stations strategies down to 
memoryless reputation-driven (that is, the history of observed 
behaviors and utilities is only accounted for through the current 
reputation value). As discussed in Section II.C, CoSX(k) is 
fixed throughout station X’s kth session, and acX(t) and acBA(t) 
can only change at either station’s session ends. New behaviors 
are set at either station’s session ends, following (6) or (7). 
Station B’s strategy is represented as sB: {BE,VO}  
{0,1,…,R}  {BE,VO}2; depending on iCoSB(k) and rA(t

) it 
determines CoSB(k) at times t = B(k), and acB(t) at times t = 
B(k) or t = A(l). Given the proposed reputation scheme, a rea-
sonable heuristic strategy prescribes an upgrading SQM attack 
if rA(t

) is below a predefined threshold TB,up, so that there is no 
imminent threat of station A acquiring a reputation level that 
would lessen its concern for station B’s QoS. This means that 
station B temporarily gives precedence to receiving high QoS 
over curbing station A’s reputation. On the other hand, if rA(t

) 
is above a predefined threshold TB,down, station B attempts to 
curb station A’s rising reputation by performing a downgrading 
SQM attack on own source traffic. In this way, station A is not 
given the opportunity to raise its reputation according to (6). In 
other cases, station B behaves neutrally. Thus sB is fully char-
acterized by the pair (TB,down, TB,up), where TB,down ≥ TB,up.  
Station A’s strategy is represented as sA: {BE,VO}  
{0,1,…,R}  {BE,VO}3; depending on iCoSA(k) and rA(t

) it 
determines CoSA(k) at times t = A(k), and acA(t) and acBA(t) at 
times t = A(k) or t = B(l). Analogously to sB, it prescribes a 
combined SQM attack (an upgrading SQM attack performed 
on own source traffic and a downgrading SQM attack per-
formed on the transit traffic from station B) if rA(t

) is above a 
threshold TA,comb, a downgrading SQM attack performed on 
own source traffic if rA(t

) is below a threshold TA,down, and 
neutral behavior otherwise. This means that when rA(t

) is high, 
station A temporarily gives precedence to receiving high QoS 
over keeping the reputation high, and when rA(t

) is low, keep-
ing it away from 0 is a priority. Thus sA is fully characterized 
by the pair (TA,comb, TA,down), where TA,comb ≥ TA,down.  
Let t
+
 denote the instant of time immediately after t. Sta-
tions’ strategies are formally specified as follows: at t = B(k) 
such that A(l  1) < B(k) ≤ A(l), 
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and at t = A(k) such that B(l 1) < A(k) ≤ B(l), 
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By convention, if TA,comb = TA,down or TB,up = TB,down, the up-
per parts of (8)-(11) are checked first, i.e., when arbitrating 
between a downgrading and an upgrading or combined SQM 
attack, the former is favored. In the upper part of (9), station B 
refrains from an upgrading SQM attack (i.e., setting CoSB(k) = 
VO) when rA is high to prevent its further incrementing accord-
ing to (6); as discussed in Section III.C, setting acB(t) = VO is 
then impossible. In the middle part of (9), a downgrading SQM 
attack (i.e., setting CoSB(k) = BE) is pointless when rA is low, 
since it would imply acB(t) = BE and unnecessary loss of QoS. 
In the middle part of (11), station A does not refrain from a 
combined SQM attack when rA is high for similar reasons. At a 
low rA, station A cannot set acA(t) = VO without exposing rA to 
a decrement, since CoSA(k) = VO would also have to be set. 
Likewise, station B cannot receive high QoS while exposing 
station A to a reputation decrement, since acB(t) = VO would 
imply CoSB(k) = VO and (7) would not hold. 
When seeking high utilities UA and UB, stations A and B 
engage in a one-shot noncooperative game {A,B}, SA  SB, 
(UA,UB), where the set SX of feasible station X’s strategies con-
sists of threshold pairs. (TA,comb, TA,down, TB,up, TB,down) represents 
a strategy profile. Clearly, TA,down = R or TB,down = 0 are uninter-
esting as they imply persistent downgrading SQM attacks per-
formed on source VO traffic, producing 0VO
X
u . For any set Z 
 R denote Z+ = {(x,y)  Z  Z | x ≥ y}; then SA = {0,1,…,R}+ \ 
{(R,R)} and SB = {0,1,…,R}+ \ {(0,0)}. 
V. PERFORMANCE 
To evaluate the effects of the proposed reputation scheme, 
we have simulated scenarios of the network operation accord-
ing to our model. User session attributes (LX(k))k=1,2,… = (X(k) 
 X(k1))k=1,2,… and (CoSX(k))k=1,2,… were modeled as iid se-
quences with Pr[LX(k) = k]  0.1 for 6 ≤ k ≤ 15, and various A 
and B. Per-session utilities uX(k) for successive sessions as 
well as long-term average utilities were recorded; the 
weighted-sum utilities UX were calculated assuming w = 10. 
Reputation values rA(B(k)) were also recorded, with R = 10 
and rA(0) = R fixed throughout all simulations. 
A baseline scenario is when both stations behave neutrally, 
i.e., (TA,comb,TA,down,TB,down,TB,up) = (,,,). One then ob-
serves uX(k)  0 when CoSX(k) = BE and often uX(k) < 1 when 
CoSX(k) = VO, the latter on account of “natural” competition of 
VO sessions from stations A and B. Since the received QoS 
reflects the stochastic sequence of successive sessions of BE 
and VO traffic, rA follows a random walk with a reflecting bar-
rier at rA = R; consequently, it typically drops below 0 relative-
ly soon (Fig. 3, left). To retain its privileged status at the AP, 
station A applies TA,down = 0, producing another reflecting barri-
er at rA = 0. This typically has little bearing upon 
VO
X
u  (Fig. 3, 
middle). Selecting nontrivial thresholds in SA  SB can bring 
about successful upgrading SQM attacks as well as improve 
some or both stations’ utilities (Fig. 3, right). Simulations 
demonstrate that the utility trajectories are quite sensitive to the 
relative position of the stations’ thresholds; usually rA is at-
tracted to the interval between neighboring thresholds. 
In search of high weighted-sum utilities UX, the two selfish 
stations can set in motion iterative processes such as best-reply 
dynamics or reinforcement learning. Under a wide class of 
game models, such processes are likely to reach a NE of the 
one-shot noncooperative game [13]. Therefore, even disregard-
ing the specifics of the dynamic play, one can get insight into 
its likely outcomes by studying the set of NE of the one-shot 
game. Since the iterations are possibly driven by the successive 
per-session utilities, which may be observed inaccurately, ei-
ther station may have difficulty finding an exact best reply to 
the other station’s play. A suitable solution concept is -Nash 
equilibrium (-NE). In the considered game, a strategy profile 
)ˆ,ˆ( BA ss  is an -NE if either player’s utility is within  of that 
corresponding to its best-reply strategy. That is, 
 },{   )ˆ,(max)1()ˆ,ˆ( BAXssUssU XXX
Ss
XXX
XX




 , (12) 
where  is a small number in [0, 1]. For each feasible strategy 
profile in SA  SB, 10 simulation runs have been conducted with 
fixed (A, B) and using a fixed set of pseudorandom sequences 
(LX(k))k=1,2,… and (CoSX(k))k=1,2,…. After a simulation run, the 
obtained asymptotic utilities were transformed into 
VO
X
BE
XX
wuuU   and -NE were found according to (12). Due 
to the stochastic nature of the iid sequences, each simulation 
run produced a different set of -NE, albeit with a similar utili-
ty range. Fig. 4 depicts the corresponding equilibrium 
),( VO
X
BE
X
uu  pairs for various (A, B). It is visible that: 
 the sets of long-term average utility pairs at -NE are quali-
tatively not very sensitive to (A, B), 
 the concept of -NE filters out strategy profiles producing 
0 VO
X
BE
X
uu , i.e., selfish dynamic play is not likely to 
starve station A or B; this is in contrast with the play with no 
reputation scheme or under ill-chosen strategy profiles, 
 when distinctly more importance is attached to VO traffic, 
i.e., w > 1, two types of -NE occur: at the more desirable 
type, BE
X
u  is close to 0, hence few upgrading SQM attacks 
are successful, and  VO
X
u  is typically not lower than in the 
absence of SQM attacks; at the other type, near the diagonal 
VO
X
BE
X
uu  , the utilities are more balanced, with 0BE
X
u  sig-
nifying frequent successful SQM attacks, and VO
X
u  some-
what lower than in the absence of SQM attacks, and 
 at -NE, ac
B
ac
A
uu   occurs more often than not; thus, as ex-
pected, dynamic rational play permits station A to capitalize 
 
Fig. 4. Stations’ long-term average utilities at -NE for  = 15%, w = 10 and various (A, B); left: (0.3, 0.7), middle: (0.5, 0.5), right: (0.7, 0.3). 
 
Fig. 3. Utility and reputation trajectories for (A, B) = (0.5, 0.5) (with (
o
A
u , o
B
u ) = (0.5, 0.5)) and various strategy profiles (TA,comb, TA,down, TB,down, TB,up);  left: 
(,,,), middle: (,0,,), right: (3,1,4,1); depicted are moving averages with learning constant decaying as k0.05, asymptotic values approximate 
ac
X
u . 
Note that in the left and middle figures, 
BE
X
u  assumes only zero values for X  {A, B}. 
on its proximity to the AP and not to feel abused by relaying 
transit traffic from station B. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a game-theoretic model of a cooperative 
two-hop wireless relay network where stations can execute 
SQM attacks to improve received QoS. To discourage such 
attacks, which easily lead to station B starvation, we have de-
signed a reputation-based incentive scheme called RISC2WIN. 
The scheme instills a noncooperative game between stations A 
and B. Provided that both stations attach distinctly more im-
portance to high-priority traffic and assuming plausible thresh-
old-based attack strategies we have demonstrated through sim-
ulation that at no -Nash equilibrium of the game does starva-
tion occur and moreover, (i) both stations A and B attack with 
restraint, (ii) the QoS of intrinsically high-priority traffic de-
pends only on the “natural” competition for the A-to-AP wire-
less link between such traffic from stations A and B, and (iii) 
station A typically does not receive lower QoS for its source 
traffic than does station B. To the best of our knowledge, 
RISC2WIN is the first cooperative two-hop communication 
scheme to ensure (i)-(iii) in the presence of SQM attacks. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to implement on top of any wireless tech-
nology. 
As future work, we plan to analyze other rational strategies 
(e.g., reinforcement learning, trial-and-error, or regret-based), 
and convergence to -NE under dynamic game scenarios. 
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